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Abstract
One of the main aims of certiﬁcate based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to provide authentication in
distributed systems. Through its functions, PKI authentication can be viewed as a re-usable component that
can be integrated with other systems to oﬀer strong authentication, scalability, and mobility, particularly for
large organizations. PKI has been used to describe authentication in various types of applications ranging
from e-commerce and web services applications to large scale systems such as Grid computing. This paper
presents a formal approach for modeling certiﬁcate based PKI authentication. The approach makes use
of two complementary models: one is state-based, described in Z, and the other is event-based, expressed
in the Process Algebra of Hoare’s Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). The former will be used to
capture the state of PKI key components used in the authentication process, the relationships between them,
and model “back-end” operations on these components. Whereas the latter, CSP, will be used to model
behavior, and in particular, “front-end” interactions and communications. Only when this authentication
mechanism is properly formulated, reasoning about its correctness, vulnerabilities and usability can be
scrutinized and possibly aided by automation.
Keywords: Formal Methods, Z, CSP, Security, Authentication, Distributed systems, Correctness.
1 Introduction
Certiﬁcate based public Key Infrastructures (PKI) [2] have been the source of many
of the radical advances in the evolution of security solutions to: authentication,
authorization, conﬁdentiality, integrity, and accountability. PKI has been used in a
wide variety of distributed applications ranging from e-commerce and web services
applications to complex systems such as Grid computing and virtual organizations
[25]. Also, PKI has been used in the design of security protocols such as Secure
Socket Layer (SSL/TLS) [24] and Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) [4] with the
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main aim is to provide authentication. This refers to the ability to demonstrate the
identity of an entity (human user, server, or a service) to any interested party [5].
Despite its widespread adoption, however, certiﬁcate based PKI still “suﬀers
from certain ambiguity and lack of understanding and precision” [11]. The ability
to have a clear and rigorous understanding of PKI-authentication requirements is
particularly signiﬁcant when building secure, reliable, and reusable PKI authen-
tication components. However, poor implementations have been the main factor
that has badly inﬂuenced the use of PKI based authentication on a large scale [18].
This is due to several reasons according to [1]: (1) PKI can be viewed as a complex
distributed information system in which there is a potential risk that design errors
and undesirable properties emerge causing considerable costs for failures to meet
the intended requirements; (2) diﬃculty of integration into existing applications; (3)
and lack of clear and rigorous approaches that enable reasoning about correctness of
PKI systems’ administrative side and their security and reliability. Successful PKI
implementations have been restricted to “closed” environments where a conserva-
tive security policy can be applied in order to produce an eﬀective implementation
[19].
The primary aim of this paper is to present a formal model for certiﬁcate based
PKI systems by combining and customizing existing formal frameworks for state-
based and event-based systems. The model is formulated in speciﬁcation notation
Z [26,8,22], which is particularly suited for concisely describing state-based systems
and reasoning about them. The speciﬁcation consistency is checked using ZTC tool
[10]. Then, the behavior of the PKI system components is captured using Hoare’s
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [6]. When a certiﬁcate based PKI
system is properly formulated, reasoning about its correctness, vulnerabilities and
usability can be scrutinized and possibly aided by automation. This approach can be
reﬁned to deal with a wide range of components such as authorization and auditing,
and would be useful in helping developers to have a clear and rigorous understanding
of components during the design, analysis and implementation phases.
In this paper, we do not attempt to consider all the functions provided in a
typical PKI system such as key generation and revocation-list management. We
are interested in authentication related operations, security knowledge of the par-
ticipants (user, server), security tokens, and administrative operations such as
adding/removing users and trusting certiﬁcate authorities. We assume that: this
PKI system will work in a closed environment, where all users can be identiﬁed and
every user holds one certiﬁcate and its corresponding private key; also, PKI entities
(i.e. client, server) do not need to negotiate which cryptographic algorithms they
will all use.
The paper begins with an overview of certiﬁcate based PKI. In Section 3, a
formal model for a PKI authentication system is constructed by stating its key
components and describing the mathematical relationships between them using Z
notation. Section 4 presents the process architecture for PKI authentication ex-
pressed in CSP notation. Section 5 describes typical administrative operations
performed by a system administrator on the authentication server, which are for-
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mally described in Z. Section 6 gives an overview of related work. Section 7 is the
conclusion.
2 Overview of PKI
PKI is based on asymmetric cryptography [21] concept in which each user has a
related pair of keys: a public key and a corresponding private key. When such a key
pair is generated, the public key is intended to be made public, whereas the private
key should only be known and protected by the user. One of the most currently
used public key cryptographic algorithm is RSA [15] since it is suitable for both
encryption and digital signatures.
Public Key encryption is used to maintain the privacy of data communicated
over a public network (Fig. 1). When a message is transmitted using public key
encryption, it is the public key of the recipient that is used to encrypt. For example,
consider a user A with a public key pk and private key sk respectively that can be
used with RSA algorithm. Another user, say B , wishing to send a message m to
A, obtains A’s public key, uses RSA to obtain the encryption c = RSApk m, and
transmits c to A. To decrypt c, A applies RSA to obtain the original message
RSA sk (RSApk m) = m. Public Key encryption also provide digital signature
to ensure data integrity. When the private key is used for encrypting a message
(known as signing) then any recipient who can obtain the corresponding public key
can decrypt it. The relationship between the public key and the private key using
RSA algorithm can be summarized by the following expressions:
RSApk (RSA sk m) = m (1)
RSA sk (RSApk m) = m (2)
Encryption
(RSA)
Public Key
Decryption
(RSA)
Private Key
Encryption
(RSA)
Public Key
Decryption
(RSA)
Private Key
Fig. 1. Public Key Encryption and Data Signing
In order to ensure the authenticity of public keys, digital certiﬁcates are used to
enable the binding of a public key to identifying information about a subject on the
certiﬁcate (i.e people, servers, organizations) in such a way that its integrity and
validity can be veriﬁed [2]. Digital certiﬁcates can be viewed as a security token in
which public keys may be stored, distributed or forwarded over a public network
such as the Internet. In PKI, the binding between subject and key is established
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by a trusted third party called Certiﬁcation Authority (CA) (also known as Issuer).
The primary function of the CA is to generate, publish, revoke, and archive the
public key certiﬁcates that binds the user identity with the user’s public key. When
a CA issues a certiﬁcate to a user, it signs it with its private key to ensure that any
modiﬁcation on the certiﬁcate can be detected. The CA also issues a certiﬁcate for
itself (called root certiﬁcate). Anyone who wants to use a certiﬁcate must have a
valid copy of the public key of the CA who issued the certiﬁcate, and must trust
the CA (by having a copy of the root certiﬁcate). One can also choose where the
key pair is generated. The keys can either be generated by the CA for the client
or the client can generate the keys for itself and provide a copy of the public key
to the CA to certify (in this work we assume that the client already has a key pair
certiﬁed by a trusted CA).
The main characteristics of a typical certiﬁcate consists of: names of the subject
and issuer, a public key associated with the subject, a validity period, an identiﬁer
for the cryptographic algorithms used by the CA to sign this certiﬁcate and another
identiﬁer for the public key algorithm with which the public key on the certiﬁcate
is used (i.e RSA, Diﬃe-Hellmann). X509 version 3 (Fig. 2) is the most currently
used PKI standard for digital certiﬁcates [7].
Fig. 2. A Sample X509 Digital Certiﬁcate.
The main assumption when using public key cryptography is that only the owner
of the certiﬁcate knows the private key corresponding to the public key on the
certiﬁcate and that users (also CA management) are responsible for ensuring the
conﬁdentiality of their private keys.
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3 Formal Speciﬁcation
In the following paragraphs, formal models of a Certiﬁcate Authority (CA), digital
certiﬁcate, a user and an authentication server are constructed in order to develop an
understanding of the whole PKI authentication system. An appropriate abstraction
of the CA, certiﬁcate, user and the server can be well formulated as a state-based
model. The model assumes the existence of the following types:
[Subject ,Key ,Data,SerialNb,CipherAlgName,CertAuthorityName,Date]
to denote the set of all possible users, public/private keys, encrypted and plain
data, serial number of each digital certiﬁcate, names of cryptographic algorithms,
names of the certiﬁcate authorities, and dates respectively. We assume that there
are standard implementations of the cryptographic algorithms supported by the
CA, the client and the server.
Let [[algo]] denotes the semantic of the cryptographic algorithm, algo. For ex-
ample, one of the most common used cryptographic algorithms is AES [15]. The
semantic of AES is a function that takes a key and data to be encrypted, and
returns the data in encrypted form.
[[ ]] : CipherAlgName → Key → (Data → Data)
Let validDate be a global relation that relates a date d and a pair of dates
(d1, d2) if and only if d lies between d1 and d2. This relation will be used to check
whether a certiﬁcate has expired or not.
[Date]
validDate : Date ↔ (Date ×Date)
∀ d , d1, d2 : Date • d validDate (d1, d2) ⇔ d1 ≤ d ∧ d ≤ d2
Let validPublicKeyPair be a relation that associates a public to its corresponding
private key. This relation is used to ensure that key generated for the user are valid.
[CipherAlgName,Data,Key ]
validPKIKeyPair : Key ↔ Key
pkiAlgoName : CipherAlgName
m : Data
pk , sk : Key
pk validPKIKeyPair sk ⇔
[[pkiAlgoName]] pk ([[pkiAlgoName]] sk m) = m ∧
[[pkiAlgoName]] sk ([[pkiAlgoName]] pk m) = m
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3.1 Specifying Certiﬁcate Authority
The role of the CA is to create and sign digital certiﬁcates with its secret key and
maintain a list of certiﬁcates that are not valid anymore, also known as certiﬁcate
revocation lists (CRL). Some of this information is made public so that clients and
servers can verify certiﬁcates issued by the CA. The CA can be modeled as a data
type which can be formulated as follows:
PublicCAInfo
name : CertAuthorityName
publicKey : Key
ca revocationList : PSerialNb
ca SupportedCrypto : PCipherAlgName
where name, is the the name of the CA; publicKey , denotes the unique
public key of the CA; ca revocationList , is a set of revoked certiﬁcates; and
ca SupportedCrypto, is a set representing the names of the supported crypto-
graphic algorithms used for signing certiﬁcates and veriﬁcation.
The CA also has information that are private and can only be known by the
CA management such as the secret key corresponding to the CA’s public key and a
documentation of the issued certiﬁcates. This private information can be captured
by deﬁning additional ﬁelds, secretKey , and issued , a function that relates a serial
number to a certiﬁcate.
PrivateCAInfo
PublicCAInfo
issued : SerialNb → Certiﬁcate
secretKey : Key
The CA, CertAuthority , is then modeled as a data type which can be captured
using the conjunction of the private and public CA information:
CertAuthority =̂ PublicCAInfo ∧ PrivateCAInfo
3.2 Specifying Digital Certiﬁcate
A digital certiﬁcate typically consists of: issuer , the name of the certiﬁcate authority
that issued the certiﬁcate; serial , serial number of the certiﬁcate; subject , subject’s
name to be associated with the public key on the certiﬁcate; publicKey , public
key of the subject; validity , the validity date of the certiﬁcate; pkiAlgoName, the
name of the public key algorithm with which the public key on the certiﬁcate is
used (e.g. RSA or Diﬃe-Hellman); and caSignatureAlgoName, the name of the
signature algorithm used by the CA to generate the signature on this certiﬁcate.
The certiﬁcate data part can be abstracted in Z as follows:
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CertiﬁcateData
issuer : CertAuthorityName
serial : SerialNb
subject : Subject
publicKey : Key
validity : Date ×Date
pkiAlgoName : CipherAlgName
caSignatureAlgoName : CipherAlgName
The signature part consists of the digital signature, caSignature, created by the
issuer, thereby binding the subject’s identity to the speciﬁed public key. The data
type certiﬁcate is described in the Z schema Certiﬁcate. In addition to these ﬁelds,
there are others that we chose not to include as they are not relevant here.
Certiﬁcate
CertiﬁcateData
caSignature : Data
3.3 Specifying User Credentials
The model of a user focuses primarily on the security knowledge that the user must
possess and maintain for the purpose of authentication. The user’s information
that are public knowledge, Public UserCredrential , comprises two components: (1)
cert , a digital certiﬁcate issued by a trusted CA; (2) userSupportedCrypto, a list of
supported cryptographic algorithms for key generation and ciphering data commu-
nicated with other entities. Here, for simplicity, it is assumed that the user has one
certiﬁcate only. The user’s information which is publicly known can be formulated
in Z as follows:
Public UserCredrential
cert : Certiﬁcate
userSupportedCrypto : PCipherAlgName
cert .caSignatureAlgoName ∈ userSupportedCrypto
cert .pkiAlgoName ∈ userSupportedCrypto
The information that can only be viewed by the user comprises two components:
(1) user’s private key, secretKey ; (2) the list of trusted CAs, trustedCA, a set of CA’s
trusted by the user, caKey , a relation that associates CA’s with their corresponding
public keys. The user’s private information can then be described in Z as follows:
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Private UserCredrential
secretKey : Key
trustedCA : PCertAuthorityName
caKey : CertAuthorityName → Key
trustedCA ⊆ dom caKey
As a result, the state of a user can then be constructed of public and private
information as shown in the UserCredential schema. The invariant states that
the issuer of the certiﬁcate is trusted by the user.
UserCredential
Public UserCredrential
Private UserCredrential
cert .issuer ∈ trustedCA ∧
cert .publicKey validPKIKeyPair secretKey
3.4 Authentication Server
In this paper, it is assumed that the authentication server operates in a closed envi-
ronment such as in a Bank or a University. The server administrator is responsible
for maintaining a set of current registered users. Therefore, authenticating users
can be achieved by validating their certiﬁcates, verifying that they have knowledge
of the private key corresponding to the one on the certiﬁcate, and by checking that
their subject name is in the list of registered users. In open systems, there is no need
for the registered users set; any user who can pass the validation and veriﬁcation
phases can be considered authenticated. The abstract state of an authentication
server consists of the following six components:
• registered users, a set of known users
• key association, a partial function that associates each subject with its public
key
• trustedCA, a set of trusted CAs
• caKey relation that relates each CA trusted by the server to its public key
• revoked , a set of certiﬁcates that have been revoked
• today , the current date when the authentication is taking place
• serverSupportedCrypto, a list of cryptographic algorithms supported by the server
This can be formulated in as a schema as follows:
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AuthenticationServer
registered users : P Subject
trustedCA : PCertAuthorityName
key association : Subject → Key
caKey : CertAuthorityName → Key
revoked : P SerialNb
today : Date
serverSupportedCrypto : PCipherAlgName
dom key association = registered users ∧ trustedCA ⊆ dom caKey
The invariant states that every user must have a public key. The authentication
server decision whether the authentication has failed or succeeded is reﬂect by an
output response drawn from the following type Report :
Report ::= Auth Success | Auth Failure
Let the schema Success (Failure respectively) indicates the successful completion of
(failure to complete respectively) the authentication operation.
Success
resp! : Report
resp! = Auth Success
Failure
resp! : Report
resp! = Auth Failure
3.5 Validating Certiﬁcate
An authentication server considers a digital certiﬁcate as valid if: (1) the certiﬁcate
is issued by CA trusted by the server; (2) the certiﬁcate has not been revoked by
checking it against a revocation list; (3) the certiﬁcate dates are still valid (hasn’t
expired); (4) the certiﬁcate has not been modiﬁed since it was created: this can be
achieved by checking that the signature on the certiﬁcate is valid. It is important to
know that verifying a certiﬁcate requires possession of the issuer’s public Key, which
is computed by caKey(cert?.issuer)). The veriﬁcation process can be captured as
follows:
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CertValidationOk
ΞAuthenticationServer
cert? : Certiﬁcate
certData : Certiﬁcate → Data
cert?.issuer ∈ trustedCA ∧ cert?.serial /∈ revoked ∧
today validDate cert?.validity ∧
[[cert?.caSignatureAlgoName]]
(caKeycert?.issuer) cert?.caSignature = certData(cert?)
Where certData is a function that returns the data from a certiﬁcate. This
data is usually signed by the CA to ensure the certiﬁcate integrity. This function
is used in the certiﬁcate signature validation in order to compare the certiﬁcate
signature with the data on the certiﬁcate. In practice, the certData function can be
a hash function and the signature is the encryption of the hashed certiﬁcate using
the issuing CA’s private key.
3.6 Verifying User Knowledge of the Secret Key
The authentication server can establish that a user knows the private key cor-
responding to a public key on a certiﬁcate by having the following as inputs: a
certiﬁcate, cert , a challenge nonce generated by the server, and what is believed
to be the nonce signed with the user’s private key, signed nonce. The veriﬁcation
operation succeeds when the subject is a registered user, and the decryption of the
signed nonce with the public key on the user’s certiﬁcate matches the original chal-
lenge, nonce, sent by server. The veriﬁcation operation can be captured in Z as
follows:
VertiﬁcationOk
ΞAuthenticationServer
cert? : Certiﬁcate
nonce? : Data
signed nonce? : Data
cert?.subject ∈ registered users ∧
[[cert?.pkiAlgoName]] cert?.publicKey signed nonce? = nonce?
3.7 Authenticating Users
A successful authentication operation can be viewed as a combination of successful
certiﬁcate validation and client signature veriﬁcation. This is modeled as a conjunc-
tion of the following operations:
AuthenticationOk =̂ CertValidationOk ∧ VertiﬁcationOk
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The whole authentication operation can then be captured as follows:
Authentication =̂ (AuthenticationOk ∧ Success) ∨ Failure
4 Process Architecture for PKI-Based Authentication
So far, we have described an authentication server and a user as completely in-
dependent systems. The CSP events depends on the Z operation deﬁned earlier.
The authentication server (denoted AS ) interacts with the clients by sending and
receiving the above messages on designated communication channels. For example,
sIn (from client) is the input channel on which the certiﬁcate and client’s response
are communicated to the server; and sOut (to client) is the output channel on
which the server’s challenge and authentication response are sent. The authentica-
tion server behavior can be informally described as follows: (1) the AS receives a
certiﬁcate from a client, say c; (2) sends a plain challenge to the client, say t ; (3)
receives a signed challenge from the client, m; (4) and checks validity of c (using
the Authentication operation described in the previous section in Z). The interface
of AS and its behavior are described below:
αAS = {sIn?req , sOut !resp}
AS = sIn?c → sOut !t → sIn?m →
( sOut !Auth Success →
THREAD(c, session Key) ||| AS <| pre (Authentication(c,nonce, reply)) |>
authentResp!Failure → AS )
The CSP expression pre (op (i1, i2..in)) (where pre is the precondition operator) de-
notes the precondition on the state of the system and inputs which makes successful
completion of the operation op. If the precondition is true, then the server creates
a thread with a session key, say THREAD(c, session key), to serve the client while
still serving other clients. The description of the thread depends on the user’s role.
AS
(state)
sIn
sOut
CLIENT(u)
cIn
cOut
(Server Model in CSP) (Client Model in CSP)
Fig. 3. CSP models for Client and Server
4.1 Client Behavior
A typical interaction between a user, u0 =< cert0, issuer0, publickey0, secretkey0 >,
with a valid certiﬁcate and an authentication server can be modelled as follows:
CLIENT (u0) = cOut !u0.cert0 → cIn?t → cOut !m → cIn?resp → SKIP
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Where, t is the random challenge, m = [[u0.cert0.pkiAlgName0]] u0.secretKey0 t ]
is the encryption of the challenge with the user’s secret key using the PKI algorithm
named on the certiﬁcate, and resp is the authentication result. If the authentication
succeeds, the client will behave as authenticated
The result of CLIENT (u0) sequence of interactions with the authentication
server is calculated using a parallel composition (Figure 4) of CLIENT and AS
processes as follows:
CLIENT (u0)[rep/cOut , req/cIn] ‖ AS (state)[rep/sIn, req/sOut ]
= req !Success → AS (state)
AS
(state)
CLIENT(u)
req
rep
Fig. 4. PKI Authentication in CSP
5 Administrative operations
We consider some of the main administrative operations on the
AuthenticationServer system namely: AddUser , RemoveUser , AddTrustedCA,
and RemoveTrustedCA respectively.
AS
(state)
RemoveUser
AddUser
AddTrustedCA
RemoveTrustedCA
Fig. 5. PKI Administrative Operations
The ﬁrst operation, AddUser , receives the username and public key of a user,
username? and publicKey? respectively, and changes the state of registered users
and key association respectively in the authentication server. The precondition for
this operation to succeed states that the username? should not already be in the
registered users set (unique) otherwise all other components remain unchanged.
The operation is captured in Z as follows:
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AddUser
ΔAuthenticationServer
username? : Subject
publicKey? : Key
resp! : Report
username? /∈ registered users ⇒
registered users ′ = registered users ∪ {username?} ∧
key association ′ =
key association ∪ {username? → publicKey?} ∧
resp! = Succeeded
username? ∈ registered users ⇒
registered users ′ = registered users ∧
key association ′ = key association ∧ resp! = Failed
The operation RemoveUser receives a username as argument and removes it with its
corresponding public key from the authentication server. The precondition states
that the username? must exists in the registered users set.
RemoveUser
ΔAuthenticationServer
username? : Subject
resp! : Report
username? ∈ registered users ⇒
registered users ′ = registered users \ {username?} ∧
key association ′ = {username?} − key association ∧
resp! = Succeeded
username? /∈ registered users ⇒
registered users ′ = registered users ∧
key association ′ = key association ∧ resp! = Failed
AddTrstedCA operation receives a CA’s name and public key respectively as
arguments and add them to the trusted CA relation, trustedCA on the server. The
precondition for this operation is that the CA’s name should not already be in the
trusted CA list.
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AddTrustedCA
ΔAuthenticationServer
ca Name? : CertAuthorityName
ca Key? : Key
resp! : Report
ca Name? /∈ trustedCA ⇒
trustedCA′ = trustedCA ∪ {ca Name?} ∧
caKey ′ = caKey ∪ {ca Name? → ca Key?} ∧
resp! = Succeeded
ca Name? ∈ trustedCA ⇒
trustedCA′ = trustedCA ∧
caKey ′ = caKey ∧ resp! = Failed
RemoveTrustedCA operation received the name of a trusted CA as input and
removes it from the trusted CA relation. The precondition for this operation to
succeed is that the CA‘s name should already be on the trusted list.
RemoveTrustedCA
ΔAuthenticationServer
ca Name? : CertAuthorityName
resp! : Report
ca Name? ∈ trustedCA ⇒
trustedCA′ = trustedCA \ {ca Name?} ∧
resp! = Succeeded
ca Name? /∈ trustedCA ⇒
trustedCA′ = trustedCA ∧ resp! = Failed
6 Related Work
Formal methods have been used for specifying, formulating, designing, analyz-
ing, and verifying cryptographic protocols and particularly authentication protocols
[20,3,4]. The literature also contains a number of approaches for applying formal
methods to the PKI problem [13,16,9,11,23,14]. In [14], the authors presented a
formal speciﬁcation of a certiﬁcate management management system and some ba-
sic operations such as certiﬁcate issuing, certiﬁcate revocation using a state based
approach. Schneider, Ryan, and Lowe developed formal security analysis methods
which were successfully used to ﬁnd security ﬂaws or prove their absence using CSP
[20,3]. Woodcock and his colleagues [17] as well as Laurence [12] have used a combi-
nation of state-based Z speciﬁcations and event-based CSP models to capture and
reason about distributed applications.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, key components of certiﬁcate based PKI were formalized in order to
have a clear and rigorous understanding of them and to avoid ambiguities. These
components were used as building block to construct a formal model for certiﬁcate
based PKI authentication. The formalization of the PKI authentication system is
expressed by combining some aspects of Z and CSP notations. The consistency of
the model is checked with ZTC tool.
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